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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the last century, the prospect of a permanent International Criminal Court (hereinafter
the “ICC”) to adjudicate crimes of international concern has been under consideration by the
international community.1 Proponents insist an ICC will provide a neutral forum necessary to
overcome legal barriers to bringing war criminals to justice.2 Clearly, there are benefits to
international law by the creation of an ICC,3 but several valid concerns4 exist, including the
rather monumental problem that the United States may not legally become a part of the ICC
without an amendment to its Constitution.

1

Bryan F. MacPherson, Building An International Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13 Conn. J. Int’l L. 1, 11
(Winter, 1998).
2
Kai I. Rebane, Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need for an International Criminal Court to Safeguard
Individual Rights, 19 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1636, 1672 (1996); See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International
Human Rights Law in International Law 894, 895 (Barry E. Carter & Philip R. Trimble eds., 1995).
3
Daniel B. Magraw, Report of the American Bar Association in Support of the ICC, presented to the American Bar
Association Mid-Year Conference, San Diego, CA, 1 (19 February 2001).
4
Patricia A. McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sovereignty Against the
Demands for International Justice, 12 St. John’s J. Legal Comment 535, 538 (1997); See Joel Caviccia, The
Prospect for an International Criminal Court in the 1990’s, 10 Dick. J. Int’l L. 223 (1992) (claiming that competing
forces of “sovereignty” and “international order” have previously frustrated promulgation of a permanent
International Criminal Court.)
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On July 17, 1998, a United Nations Conference in Rome, Italy, approved the “Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.”5 The vote was one hundred and twenty to seven,
with twenty-one abstentions. Most notably, the United States, Israel, and China were among
those voting against the convention.6 Pursuant to the Statute, the ICC will be created when it is
ratified by sixty nations.7

Thus far, one hundred and thirty-nine nations have signed the

convention, including the United States, and twenty-nine countries have ratified the treaty.8 The
United States has made it clear, however, it will not ratify the treaty in the near future.9 One of
the major limitations to ratification by the United States is the perceived possible violation of the
United States Constitution of becoming a part of such a court. In May 2002, President George
W. Bush formally "unsigned" the ICC treaty and began the diplomatic process of negotiating
agreements with States that are signatories to "guarantee Americans would not be extradited" to
the ICC.10
The purpose of this paper is (1) to provide historical background to the ICC; (2) to
provide an overview of the ICC structure, including the court’s subject matter and personal
matter jurisdiction; and, primarily, (3) to analyze and discuss the constitutional objections to
possible United States ratification.
II.

History of the International Criminal Court

5

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, reprinted at 37 ILM 998
(1998) (hereinafter “ICC Statute”).
6
John R. Schmertz, Jr. and Michael Meier, By Large Majority, U.N. Conference in Rome Approves Permanent
International Criminal Court, 4 Int’l L. Update 88 (July, 1998). (Even if the executive branch of the United States
had supported the statute, Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated
that a proposal for an international tribunal that could prosecute American soldiers for war crimes would be “dead
on arrival” at his committee).
7
ICC Statute, supra note 5, art 126(1).
8
See Ratification Status at www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm (updated 27 February 2000).
9
Nicholas S. Curabba, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Selected Legal and Constitutional
Issues, Congressional Research Services, 12 (February 22, 1999)
10
Davis, Stephen F., The International Criminal Court: A Return To Nuremberg?, Proceedings, 70, 72 (March
2003).
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The ICC Statute is not a novel idea. The concept of an ICC was first discussed in the late
nineteenth century incident to the Hague Conventions.11 However, world politics, concerns
about protecting national sovereignty, and the Cold War all contributed to stifling the ICC’s
development. Although a complete historical review12 of the effort to create an ICC is beyond
the scope of this paper, there are several important milestones the discussion of which will
provide context.
A.

Pre-World War I History

The origin of the creation of an international penal code and ICC can be traced back to
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The First Hague Convention in 1899 is noteworthy
for the creation of the Court of Arbitral Justice.13 Then, in 1907 at the Second Hague Peace
Conference, various States, including the United States, perceived a conflict between the
jurisdictional power of the United States Supreme Court and the potential jurisdictional power of
the proposed ICC.14 As discussed infra, these same concerns exist relating to the United States
joining the ICC today.
The Hague Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
which codified the principles of war on land and set out the foundation for the Nuremberg Trials,
was an important instrument in the evolving international consensus that an ICC was needed.15
And notably, the later Nuremberg International Military Tribunal specifically recognized the
11

Convention (II) with Respect to the Land and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulation concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899: 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Oct. 18, 1907, 26 Stat. 2277,
T.S. 539.
12
For an entire historical review of the creation of the ICC see Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International
Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 419, 421 (Spring, 1995);
Mark A. Bland, An Analysis of the United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in
the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels, Problems, Prospects, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 233, 252 (Fall, 1994).
13
Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 419, 421 (Spring, 1995).
14
Id.
15
Bland, supra note 11, at 252.
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1907 pact as declaratory of customary international law and, thus, binding on all nations,
regardless of their signatory status.16
B.

The Versailles Peace Conference

World War I kept the idea of an ICC in the background until 1919, but following the war,
United States President Woodrow Wilson proposed the creation of the League of Nations.17
Significant in the thinking by the League of Nations proponents was the reality that automatic
weapons, chemical weapons, aircraft, armored vehicles, and other new weapons were used for
the first time.

These new instrumentalities of war created far greater potential for non-

combatants to suffer from indiscriminate military attacks.
In 1919, the Versailles Peace Conference created the Commission on the Responsibility
of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.18 The Commission concluded
individuals responsible for genocide, regardless of rank or status, should be prosecuted before a
multinational tribunal.19 The tribunal would apply “the principles of the law of nations as they
result from the usage’s among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates
of public conscience.”20

Not surprisingly, many States objected to the concept of having

individuals of all rank subject to an international tribunal. The United States, for example,
argued that trying the Kaiser before a foreign power would violate Germany’s sovereignty.21 In
the end, the Commission rejected the contention that high officials of enemy States could be held

16

Id.
Jamison, supra note 11, at 422.
18
Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years
Later, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 415, 417 (Spring, 1998).
19
Id.; See Memorandum of Reservations Presented By The Representatives of the United States to the Report Of the
Commission On Responsibility, reprinted in 14 Am. J. Int’l. L. 95, 127-143; See Gregory P. Noone and Douglas W.
Moore, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 46 Naval L. Rev. 112, 113 (1999).
20
Id.
21
MacPherson, supra note 1, 5.
17
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“personally accountable” for starting war.22

For the future, however, the Commission did

recommend penal sanctions be provided for initiating a war of aggression.23 One American
commentator rationalized that while it “shocks our sense of justice that the monstrous war crimes
of Germany should go unpunished, it is perhaps best, in the view of the interest of all the world
and the future generations that this should be so rather than further seeds of hatred between the
nations should be sown.”24
Ultimately, Article 14 of the League of Nations Charter did create a permanent Court of
International Justice, and the Executive Council of the League of Nations drafted a statute for a
permanent Court of International Justice that was completed in 1921. The Statute called for a
High Court of International Justice to try crimes constituting a breach of international public
order or against the Universal Law of Nations.25 This Court’s jurisdiction was limited to
disputes in which the States voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction.26 In due course, many States
ratified the Statute,27 but similar to the Rome Conference, the main exception was the United
States,28 with the United States Senate failing to support a measure produced by its own
President. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the permanent Court of International Justice
was that it was the predecessor to the International Court of Justice following World War II.29
In addition to creating the permanent Court of International Justice, during the 1930’s,
the international community took a stance on the punishment of terrorists by setting up a

22

Id., at 5
Id.
24
George Gordon Battle, The Trials before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Germans Accused of War Crimes, 8 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 17 (1921).
25
MacPherson, supra note 1, at 7.
26
Jamison, supra note 11, at 422.
27
Jamison, supra note 11, at 423.
28
Id.
29
Id.
23
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Convention on Terrorism to meet in Geneva.30 During the Convention, member States discussed
the possibility of creating an international criminal code, extraditing terrorists, and creating an
ICC.31 These reasons would very much resemble the calls for a modern ICC.
C.

World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunals and Control Council Ten

The theoretical concerns hindering efforts to prosecute war criminals following the Great
War were swept aside during World War II. By the end of World War II, consensus within the
international community had grown into four general principles of international law.32

On

August 8, 1945, the four allied powers signed the London Agreement,33 establishing an
International Military Tribunal.34 Unlike World War I, the United States, through the Justice
Department,35 took the principal leadership role by demanding that Germany’s leaders be held
accountable for war crimes.36 The Nuremberg Tribunal, as it was commonly called, indicted
twenty-four high ranking Nazi officials on October 16, 1945, for war crimes, crimes against
peace, and crimes against humanity.37
Following the Nuremberg Trials, the Allied Powers agreed to prosecute alleged German
war criminals apprehended within their respective zones of occupation.38

Thereafter, war

criminals were tried by international tribunals called “Control Council 10” courts, created by

30

Id.
Jamison, supra note 11, at 423.
32
Jamison, supra note 11, at 424-425. (The four major principles were as follows: (1) Crimes against peace, defined
as the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties,
agreements, or assurances or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for any of the foregoing; (2) Crimes
against humanity, defined as crimes such as murder or extermination; (3) War crimes, defined as any delineation of
the Hague Conventions; and (4) Conspiracy to commit any of these crimes).
33
London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
34
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; MacPherson, supra
note 1, at 8.
35
Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and American Concerns, 6 Pace Int’l L.
Rev. 121, 126 (Winter, 1994).
36
MacPherson, supra note 1, at 8-9.
37
Id.
38
See Control Council Law No. 10, in IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILIT.
TRIB. UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 XVIII (1952).
31
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agreement and largely following the Nuremberg precedent. The courts held that crimes against
humanity must be connected to a war crime or crime against peace.39 Thus, crimes committed
before the war were not to be considered in Control Council 10 courts.40
In addition to the Control Council 10 courts, United States General Douglas MacArthur
established war crimes tribunals for Southeast Asia in Tokyo,41 with less serious Japanese
defendants tried in Yokohama.42 Since the United States controlled the Pacific Theater during
the war, an international agreement similar to the London Agreement was not required to
establish the Japanese tribunals.43
The Tribunals set up at Nuremberg and Tokyo are recognized as the first international
tribunals to bring war criminals to justice.44 The Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, hereinafter
the Nuremberg Charter, became a piece of the foundation for a permanent ICC. For example,
article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter provided for the punishment of crimes against peace;45
Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter provided for the punishment of war crimes;46 and Article
6(c)47 of the Nuremberg Charter provided the first formal definition and punishment of crimes

39

Id.
Lippman, supra note 17, at 432.
41
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
42
MacPherson, supra note 1, at 8-9.
43
Although General MacArthur unilaterally set up the Tokyo Tribunals, the nineteen Allied countries appointed a
judge to sit in Tokyo. See Joseph Berry Keenan and Brendan Francis Brown, Crimes Against International Law 1-2
(1950); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in Historical Context, 1999 St. Louis Warsaw Trans.
L. 55, 62 (1999).
44
Noone, supra note 18, at 114.
45
See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 33, at Art. 6(a) states that crimes against peace are namely the planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
46
Id., at Art. 6(b) provided punishment for violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include,
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity.
47
See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 33, at Art. 6(c), which provides for the punishment of crimes against
humanity, namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
40

7

against humanity.48 The format that was established under Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter
proved highly successful for the Tribunal.49

These Tribunals set an “important precedent by

signaling the international community’s resolve to hold individuals, whether government
officials or others, personally accountable for war crimes.”50 And, by creating individual
accountability, the Tribunals thus rejected the World War I position that state sovereignty is a
defense for egregious crimes committed against mankind.51
The United Nations Charter, formed simultaneously with the Nuremberg Charter, also
embodies several of the Nuremberg Principles. For example, the United Nations Charter states
that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state....”52 The ICC’s creation
evolved primarily from the Nuremberg Tribunals and the United Nations, which encouraged the
progress of international criminal law.53
D.

The Cold War Era

In 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations appointed the International Law
Commission (ILC) to investigate the possibility of establishing a permanent ICC. In addition, on
December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly recognized “that at all periods of
history, genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order to
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,” and

or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law
of country where perpetrated.
48
Id.
49
Jamison, supra note 11, at 425.
50
Noone, supra note 18, at 114.
51
Id., at 114-15.
52
Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. NO. 993, art. 2, para. 4 (entered into force Oct.
24, 1945).
53
Noone, supra note 18, at 113.
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adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which
called for the creation of an ICC.
In 1950, the ILC proposed a Code of Offenses, which defined crimes such as the
violations of customs of war, conspiracy, and crimes against humanity.54 The ILC also included
enforcement provisions, recognizing that, otherwise, the process would be doomed to fail.55 The
ILC argued the aggression of one man should no longer be able to bring the world to its knees, as
it had in World War II.56 However, the General Assembly did not vote on the proposed statute.
Instead, the General Assembly decided to postpone consideration of the draft statute pending the
adoption of the definition of “aggression.” Today, the United States is still unwilling to support
the creation of an ICC because of the continued dispute over the definition of aggression.
During the 1960’s, concern over international crime continued to escalate, re-emerging in
the context of apartheid and racial discrimination.57 In 1978, a report of the American Bar
Association (hereinafter the ABA) argued for a court with jurisdiction limited solely to crimes
associated with the acts of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against peace, drug trafficking,
genocide, and torture. The ABA report was designed to accommodate the perceived need to
protect national sovereignty by calling for an ICC whose subject matter jurisdiction encompassed
criminal acts solely recognized by international law. In the late 1980’s, the Soviet Union, which
had long opposed the idea of an ICC, began advocating the concept of an ICC to deal with
terrorism.58
E.

The Modern Approach

54

Jamison, supra note 11, at 426.
Id., at 427
56
Id., at 427
57
Jamison, supra note 11, at 427.
58
MacPherson, supra note 1, at 12.
55
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The modern campaign to establish an ICC can be traced to a speech given by former
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev before the United Nations General Assembly encouraging
the trial of drug traffickers.59 Contrary to Gorbachev’s beliefs, however, other States foresaw a
need for an ICC because of the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the demise of bi-polar
stability, the rise of nationalistic and aggressive tendencies by many nations and the
internationalization of trade and policy.60
It was actually a group of Caribbean States, however, that most revitalized the proposal
for a permanent ICC at the United Nations General Assembly in 1989.61 These States agreed
with the Soviet position and argued that an international judicial institution could help address
narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean.62 A majority of member States joined in, arguing that
drug trafficking, global terrorism, and the birth of new nations created serious new problems in
international law.63
In 1991, the ILC adopted draft articles called the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind.64 The ILC transmitted these articles to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, who submitted the articles to all of the governments of the United Nation member
States for review.65 In 1992, the General Assembly established a working group to discuss the
proposed international criminal jurisdiction of the ICC.66

59

Evered, supra note 34, at 128.
Jamison, supra note 11, at 428.
61
See U.N. GAOR. 6th Comm., 44th Sess., 38th-41st mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/44/SR.38-41 (1989); See Evered, supra
note 23, at 127.
62
Noone, supra note 18, at 121.
63
Rebane, supra note 2, at 1665 (1996).
64
Jamison, supra note 11, at 430 citing Official Records of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR., 46th Sess., Supp.,
No. 10, at para. 173-174, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1993).
65
Id., at 431.
66
Id., at 431.
60
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In 1992, Professor Bryan MacPherson, a noted international law specialist, proposed the
creation of an ICC completely independent from the United Nations.67 This idea is now a
principal feature of the ICC, and one of the major points of contention for the United States. The
proposal set out the creation of a complete international code of crimes as a long-term goal. As a
short-term goal, the MacPherson proposal conferred subject matter jurisdiction only over war
crimes and crimes against peace. Soon thereafter, in 1992, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Special Rapperteur of the working group established by the United Nations, published a revised
version of a draft statute originally prepared and circulated in 1980.68 Professor Bassiouni
incorporated a solution to the problem of the ICC’s applicable law through a system of
transferred jurisdiction.69 Under this concept, the ICC would merely be an extension of the
United Nations’ member States’ jurisdiction, and would apply the transferring States’ criminal
law and rules of procedure.70 However, this would be dependent on the consent of the State to
transfer the legal proceedings, with its concurrence the crime was recognized under international
law.71 This proposal is similar to the current International Court of Justice structure of States
agreeing to jurisdiction. Eventually, this concept never reached the drafters of the ICC because
of the “primary jurisdiction” of the Ad Hoc Tribunals created for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
discussed infra.
In the modern age, a further complicating trend involves the increased prevalence of wars
fought within, not between, States. Perhaps the best example of this is Cambodia, where more
than 2 million people lost their lives from 1975 through 1978.

Similarly, in the former

Yugoslavia Republic of Bosnia, a civil war began in the early 1990’s where Muslims, Croatians,

67

Id., at 434.
Evered, supra note 34, at 138.
69
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute, International Criminal Tribunal 29-46 (1992).
70
Evered, supra note 34, at 139.
68
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and Serbians sparked the first real concern of genocide in Europe since World War II. This bitter
civil war, sparked by ethnic differences, destabilized an entire region of Europe. And, in the
African State of Rwanda, the death of the Rwandan President touched off a bloody civil war
where countless Tutsi and Hutus were massacred at the hands of the extremist Hutus. Clearly,
traditional international diplomacy was unable to respond to this form of intra-State conflict,72
but there was a move after these situations had stabilized somewhat to bring war criminals to
trial, leading to the international community establishing the International Ad Hoc Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.
F.

International War Crimes Tribunals
1.

Background

In the evolution of an effective permanent ICC over almost one hundred years, no events
have less continuously led to consensus within the international community than the crises
resulting in the creation of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Ad Hoc Tribunals”).
a.

The Former Yugoslavia

The summer of 1991 was extremely volatile and bloody for the former Yugoslavia.
Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on June 25, 1991. Immediately thereafter, a
civil war began in Croatia between the majority Croatian and the minority Serbian populations,
and the adjacent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, located between the remainder of Yugoslavia

71

Id.
Speech given by the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Preparatory
Committee on the establishment of an international criminal court, April, 1998.
72
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and Croatia, was quickly brought into the civil war.73 The Serbian dominated Yugoslav Federal
Army backed the Serbian combatants.
On October 15, 1991, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence
and initiated the process to secede from Yugoslavia. The European Community required that
Bosnia-Herzegovina hold an independence referendum before it would recognize the Republic as
a new State.

Although threatened with a blockade by the Federal Army, the Republic

nevertheless held its referendum on March 1, 1992. Thereafter, the European Community
formally recognized the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign State on April 6, 1992,
which led to a full-scale civil war within the new State.74
b.

Rwanda

Rwanda was the second experiment by the international community in using the Ad Hoc
Tribunals. The pre-colonial rule by the Tutsi minority, and the Tutsi role in the governing under
Belgian colonial rule, created resentment and distrust among the majority Hutu.75 In 1962,
Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium. From that time until July 1994, a variety of
Hutu factions have controlled the military and government.76 During the post-independence
period, sporadic inter-ethnic violence led to the flight of Tutsi’s into Uganda, where they formed
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).77 As a result of a 1973 military coup d’ etat, Major-General
Juvenal Habyarimana took control of the Rwanda government. Habyarimana’s regime was
clearly pro-Hutu.78 With the increased threat from the RPF in the 1990’s, the government

73

Bland, supra note 11, at 238 (The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a centrally located region composed of 4.35
million people, 43.7% of whom are Slavic Muslims, 31.3% Serbs, and 17.3% Croats).
74
Id., at 239.
75
Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 9 Fla. J. Int’l. L. 421, 422 (1994).
76
Gerard Prurnier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide, 54, 74-213 (1995).
77
Id.
78
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Rwanda Human Rights Practices (1994) (all citizens were required to carry ethnic identity
card. Ethnicity was determined by patrilineal descent).
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interned and persecuted the Tutsi under the pretense that those persecuted were accomplices of
the RPF.79
On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated when
unknown assailants shot down his airplane. Within hours after his death, extremist Hutu militias,
the Presidential Guard, and the Hutu dominated army began widespread and systematic slaughter
of moderate Hutus and all Tutsi.80 The result of this violence was the killing of an estimated
nine hundred thousand (primarily Tutsi), the internal displacement of two million Rwandan
citizens, and a mass exodus of over two million (mostly Hutu) Rwandan refugees into Zaire,
Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda.81
In July 1994, the RPF victory over the Hutu dominated Rwandan army brought an end to
the genocide campaign of the interim government.82

In August 1994, the United Nations

Security Council called upon the new Rwandan government to ensure Hutu wishing to return to
their homes would not be victims of reprisals.83 The new government, however, indicated it
intended to prosecute over 30,000 Hutu citizens for murder, genocide, and other crimes.84 This
prompted the United Nations to take unilateral action to intervene in the crisis.
2.

Establishment and Jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals.

The Ad Hoc Tribunals, the first such international courts to be set up since World War II,
have issued indictments and international arrest warrants, held fair and judicious trials, and
handed down well conceived and just judgements and sentences. The creation of the Ad Hoc
Tribunals, however, was difficult, even though it was clear domestic proceedings were
79

Catherine Newbury, Background to Genocide in Rwanda, 23 Issue 12, 14 (1995).
Prunier, supra note79, at 192-257.
81
Id., at 54.
82
Id., at 299.
83
See U.N. SCOR, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 2414th mtg, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/42
(1994).
84
Holly Burkhalter, Ending the Cycle of Retribution in Rwanda, Legal Times, 19 (August 22, 1994)
80
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inadequate in dealing with individuals accused of crimes against humanity. The major difficulty
was mobilizing the political will amongst the international community, and the resources
necessary to establish the Ad Hoc Tribunals.85
By June 1992, the situation in Bosnia had deteriorated into chaos. On July 29, 1992,
Muhamed Sacirbey, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, sent a
letter to the United Nations Security Council requesting intervention.86 In response, the Security
Council passed Resolution 771, requesting that all States and humanitarian organizations to
provide information relating to human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia. Thereafter, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 78087 in October of 1992, which created an impartial
commission of experts to examine and analyze the information collected through Resolution
771.88 After repeated demands that the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia refrain from
violating international law, the Security Council on February 22, 1993 created an international
tribunal to prosecute offenders.89
Unlike the former Yugoslavia situation in which the Bosnia Ambassador sought help
from the Security Council, the Security Council in the Rwanda case acted unilaterally. On July
1, 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935, which requested the Secretary General to
establish a commission to determine whether serious violations of humanitarian law had
occurred in Rwanda, including genocide.90 The Commission concluded genocide and systematic
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and widespread violations of humanitarian law had been committed in Rwanda, resulting in an
enormous loss of life and large numbers of displaced persons.91 The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda Statute was submitted to the Security Council in November of 1994, with
the recommendation that the Security Council create an International Tribunal for Rwanda under
the authority of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.92 In response to the SecretaryGeneral’s recommendation to create the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Security Council
passed Resolution 955 creating the tribunal responsible for bringing those responsible for the
most serious violations of international humanitarian law to justice.93 At the time Resolution 955
was passed, Rwanda was sitting on the Security Council as one of the non-permanent members
and was the only vote against the resolution.94
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Statute and the Rwanda
Statute each has one hundred and twenty eight articles. It is commonly thought the Tribunals are
separate, principally because they were authorized by different Security Council resolutions and
have different statutes, but actually, the Ad Hoc Tribunals are inseparably intertwined and can be
considered one tribunal. The Ad Hoc Tribunal’s statutes may well contribute the most to the
development of a permanent ICC statute, clearly establishing that the international community
has the ability to create a war crimes court during a conflict,95 rather than afterwards as in the
case of the World War II tribunals.
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III.
A.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Background on the establishment of the currently proposed International
Court

In response to the inadequacies of the Ad Hoc Tribunal,96 the International Law
Commission of the United Nations completed a draft statute for an ICC in 1993 and submitted it
to the United Nations. The 1993 ILC proposal limited the ICC’s jurisdiction to recognized
Conventions,97 and adopted the Ad Hoc Tribunal’s procedures governing the detention of a
person awaiting trial or appeal.

The Ad Hoc Tribunals, therefore, paved the way for the

establishment of a criminal procedure for the ICC. For various reasons, the General Assembly
sent the draft back to the ILC for revision.
In 1994, the ILC completed its work on the draft statute and again submitted it to the
United Nations General Assembly,98 whereupon, the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met twice in 1995.
After considering the Committee’s report, the General Assembly created the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to prepare a text for
submission to a diplomatic conference.
During the United Nation’s fifty-second session, the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court was
convened to finalize the establishment of an ICC.

The resulting Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court has 128 Articles. To analyze each Article is beyond the scope of
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this paper. However, it is important to address the concerns that many States, most notably the
United States, has in accepting the ICC.
The ICC is the permanent court responsible for investigating and prosecuting individuals
who commit such offenses as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Critical
analysis is narrowed to the following areas: (1) a review of the ICC’s proposed structure; (2)
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC; and (3) personal matter jurisdiction of the ICC.
B.

An analysis of the International Criminal Court

The four organs that make up the structure of the ICC99 are the Presidency, the Judiciary,
the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry. These organs are very similar to the structure of
the Ad Hoc Tribunals. All who serve in a position with the ICC have diplomatic immunity.100
1.

Structure of the Judiciary of the International Criminal Court

The hierarchical structure of the ICC is derived from both civil and common law. If an
international criminal rule of law is to gain acceptance throughout the world, it will not be
sufficient that the trials of the criminals are just, but they must be widely recognized as just.
Therefore, perceptions of fairness and due process are paramount in any international criminal
justice system.
The Presidency and the different court divisions101 are made up of eighteen judges who
serve on the ICC and are elected on a full-time basis.102 If the workload of the Court is minimal,
the judges may serve in a part-time status;103 and, if the workload becomes unmanageable, the
President may petition the member States to the ICC Statute for an increase in the number of
98
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sitting judges.104 The member States to the ICC Statute nominate judges based on four different
criteria, but there is no established means within the ICC to insure these criteria are followed,
except through the Assembly of States, which eventually votes for the individual judges.105 The
Assembly of States may establish an “Advisory Committee on nominations” to advise on the
qualifications of the nominated judges.106
The first selection criteria considered is that the judge must be of high moral character
and qualified to serve on their States’ highest court.107 Second, the nominee must be competent
in either criminal or international law.108 Third, the nominee must be fluent in one of the
working languages of the ICC.109 Fourth, there may not be two judges from the same State.110
(These criteria are similar to the requirements to sit on the Ad Hoc Tribunals.) After nomination,
judges are selected by secret vote by member States to the ICC Statute.111 Judges serve nineyear terms.112 When selecting judges, several considerations, in addition to the required criteria,
must be taken into account. First, there must be representation of the principal legal systems of
the world. Second, an equitable geographical representation must be achieved. Third, there
must be a fair gender representation on the Court.113
Judges are to serve without influence from outside sources, including their own States.114
To ensure impartiality, judges cannot have other employment during their term,115 or engage in

103

Id., art. 35(3).
Id., art. 36(2)(a).
105
Id., art. 36(8).
106
Id., art 36(4)(c).
107
Id., art. 36(3)(a).
108
ICC Statute, supra note 5, art 36(3)(b)(i) and (ii).
109
Id., art. 36(3)(c) (The Official Languages of the Court are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and
Spanish, Id., art. 50(1)).
110
Id., art 36(7).
111
Id., art 36(6)(a).
112
Id., art. 36(9)(a) (At the first selection, one third of judges elected shall serve for 3 years, one third for 6 years,
and one third for 9 years).
113
See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 36.
114
Id., art. 40(1).
104

19

activities that may interfere with their impartiality.116 If a judge’s impartiality is questioned, then
the judge is disqualified if a pre-trial court determines a conflict exists.117
The President and the First and Second Vice President are elected by an absolute majority
of the judges and serve a term of three years and are eligible only once for re-election.118 The
President, the First, and the Second Vice Presidents make up the Presidency.119 If the President
is unable to serve due to incapacity or disqualification, the line of succession falls to the First
Vice President and then the Second Vice President.120 The Presidency is responsible for the
administration of the different courts and the Registry, but not the Office of Prosecutor.121
After the initial selection of judges and the election of the Presidency, the judges are
organized into an appeals division and a trial division, which also acts as the pre-trial court.
Each division is balanced between experts in criminal law and international law,122 but there is
an expectation that each judge will be competent in both. Once a trial is complete, the convicted
person or the prosecutor may bring an appeal based on a procedural, factual, or legal error.123
(The concept that a prosecutor may bring an appeal after losing a case has caused great concern
in the United States.) If the appeals chamber finds an error, it may reverse or amend the
sentence, remand a factual issue to the original trial court, or order a new trial before a different
trial chamber.124
2.

The Office of the Prosecutor
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The Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter the “prosecutor”) operates separately and
independently from the other organs of the ICC,125 and operates with the assistance of several
deputy prosecutors.126 The prosecutor must have experience in criminal law, competence in
international law and expertise relating to sexual, gender, and age violence. As with the judges,
if an individual prosecutor’s impartiality is questioned, or if they have prior involvement with a
case on a national level, the prosecutor must be disqualified if Appeals Court discovers a conflict
exists.127 The prosecutor is prohibited from engaging in any activity likely to interfere with
prosecutorial functions. If there is a question of impartiality, the appeals division decides
whether disqualification is necessary.128
If a reasonable basis exists, the prosecutor may initiate an investigation into a crime that
is within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.129 (This prosecutorial independence and authority
was strongly criticized by many States and was one of the major reasons the United States did
not become a signatory of the Statute.130) The prosecutor’s authority is not without check since,
if a member State disagrees with the decision to either investigate or not to investigate, the issue
may be sent to the pre-trial chamber.
3.

The Registry

The Registry is responsible for all non-judicial aspects of the ICC.131 The Registrar is
elected by an absolute majority of the Judges132 and heads the Registry.133 The Registry is
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responsible for the Victims and Witnesses Unit, which provides security, counseling, and other
assistance to those appearing before the ICC.134 The Registrar records the proceedings so that no
voice will ever be silenced.135 Recording the proceedings ensures that what has shocked the
conscience of humanity should be remembered for all time.136 The Ad Hoc Tribunals have a
similar office, which has been quite effective in recording the tragic events in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia. A thorough record has proven one of the most important contributions of the
Ad Hoc Tribunals.137
C.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ICC
1.

ICC Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The majority of the State parties at the Rome Conference recognized the general
principles of criminal law and the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court as being grounded in
universally accepted and recognized law138 and decided the ICC has jurisdiction over (1) the
crime of genocide, (2) crimes against humanity, (3) war crimes, and (4) the crime of
aggression.139 These four crimes are considered part of the ICC’s inherent jurisdiction, because
violations breach the safety and peace of the international community. Because the controversy
over the definition of “aggression” postponed the creation of an ICC during the Cold War, the
drafters of the ICC Statute escaped this problem in a typical political manner – they postponed
the definition until a later, undefined date. This approach was strongly criticized by the United
States and was another reason the Statute was deemed unacceptable.
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The ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction is derived from customary international law
codified in four main treaties: (1) the Genocide Convention, (2) the Geneva Convention of 1949,
(3) the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and (4) the Nuremberg Charter.140 The crimes
codified in these treaties are identical to the subject matter authorized for the Ad Hoc
Tribunals.141 The Genocide Convention142 provides for the definition of genocide, which the
International Court of Justice upheld as a universal crime.143 The Geneva Conventions, most
notably “Common Article III,” creates protection for both military members and civilians during
war.144 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 codify the law of war.145 These conventions
are combined with the Geneva Conventions to make up a complex system known as international
humanitarian law.146 The International Court of Justice has recognized the consolidation of these
conventions to represent “fundamental rules” to be followed by all nations, not just State
signatories, because they constitute “customary international law;”147 and that the universal
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interpretation of the Nuremberg Charter makes individuals, in addition to States, responsible for
violations of the crimes embodied in these conventions.148
D.

Personal Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ICC

Once a State has ratified the ICC Statute, the ICC gains “complementary jurisdiction”
over the relevant crimes committed within those nations in the future.149 The ICC has personal
jurisdiction over a crime through three triggering mechanisms. The first two triggers occur when
crimes are referred to the ICC for investigation by a member State or through the Security
Council of the United Nations.150 The third trigger is when the Prosecutor independently
initiates an investigation.151 And if a reasonable basis for an investigation exists, the Prosecutor
presents the evidence to a pre-trial chamber, which then decides to continue with an investigation
and possible subsequent criminal litigation.152

The third trigger resembles a Grand Jury

investigation in the United States.
1.

The ICC’s Complementary Jurisdiction

With the understanding that a State’s sovereignty should be respected, the ICC Statute
emphasizes that the Court will only operate in a complementary nature to national
jurisdictions.153 The ICC is not “intended to replace national judicial systems but to permit the
exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of any national prosecution.154 Therefore, the ICC may
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not obtain personal jurisdiction if a member State has its own investigation, has decided not to
prosecute, or the prosecution has already taken place.155 However, if a State does not genuinely
carry out its prosecutorial powers pursuant to Article 20(3),156 the ICC may assume
jurisdiction.157 In determining whether a State has genuinely carried out its duties, the Court
looks at the purpose, timing, and impartiality of the national investigation or hearing.158 In this
framework, it is argued the ICC actually enhances a State’s sovereignty through recognition159
and understanding that no State, however powerful, may shield its affairs completely from
external influence.160
The ICC’s complementary jurisdiction is somewhat different than the Ad Hoc Tribunals,
which have concurrent jurisdiction. By having concurrent jurisdiction, one could conclude the
Ad Hoc Tribunals could exercise primacy over any national court system.161 Although Ad Hoc
Tribunals must make formal requests to the national courts to defer to the Tribunal’s
competence, Ad Hoc Tribunals may usurp the national courts only when the national judicial
system is determined to be disingenuous, or if the inherent crimes are tried as ordinary crimes,
with possible lesser sentences.
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Although in practice the ICC will be able to take jurisdiction from national courts for the
same reasons, the ICC has veiled what the Ad Hoc Tribunals consider concurrent jurisdiction
and primacy over national courts by use of the definition of complementary jurisdiction.162 But,
unlike the Ad Hoc Tribunals, if the ICC takes jurisdiction over a matter, a State may object to the
ICC at the earliest opportunity after the ICC’s assumption of jurisdiction.163

With a few

exceptions,164 in that circumstance, ICC investigations are suspended until the jurisdictional
dispute is resolved.165 (The ICC Statue also allows the accused to avoid the ICC’s jurisdiction if
they have been successfully prosecuted in a State for one of the inherent crimes.166 This is to
negate double jeopardy.167)
2.

Extradition and Personal Jurisdiction

A major point of contention surrounding sovereignty and personal jurisdiction of the ICC
is the issue of extradition. The practice of extradition has existed for over three thousand years,
during which treaties and custom slowly formalized the extradition process and defined methods
for pursuit of fugitives.168 A basic tenet of international law, respect for the territory and
sovereignty of other nations, has both encouraged treaties and discouraged irregular rendition,
such as kidnappings or other violations of a State’s sovereignty.169 Quite less evolved under
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international law is extradition from States to the ICC,170 which may be for the United States,
unconstitutional.
Member States to the ICC Statute, upon the written request by the ICC, are required to
“surrender,”171 not extradite, a suspected criminal.172 The word surrender is used because
extradition involves the surrender, by one nation to another, of an individual who has been
accused or convicted of an offense outside the territory of the former and within the jurisdiction
of the latter.173 Extradition operates under a type of treaty formally called “rendition.” Illegal
rendition, such as abduction, arises from the concept of reprisal and occurs outside the provisions
of a treaty.174 In the United States, the extradition process requires an extraditing judge to “either
deny extradition or commit for extradition, and then places the authority to extradite in the hands
of the Secretary of State, who may or may not extradite.”175 The Secretary of State cannot
extradite an accused if the extradition judge denies such action.176
As with current extradition law, the ICC Statute appears to allow an accused a hearing by
a member State’s court before surrender.177 Ideally, if the national court either does not agree

170

Jamison, supra note 11, at 424; See Magraw, supra note 3, at 5 stating that the United States “argues that there
should be a prohibition against the surrender of indicted individuals to the ICC without the consent of the accused’s
country of origin, if that country has not ratified the Rome Statute.”
171
See UN Press Release, Friday 26 June 1998, which stated that “extradition refers to action between States and
thus would not apply to an action between the States and the Court. Thus, surrender would be more appropriate. It
was also stressed that the Conference was mandated to establish a sui generis institution and there was a need to
abandon traditional ways of thinking, and to use terminology’s not particularly associated with certain systems.”
172
ICC Statute, supra note 5, at Art. 89(1) states “The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a
person, together with the material supporting the request outlined in Article 91, to any State on the territory on
which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of the State in the arrest and surrender of such a
person. State parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under their national law,
comply with the requests and surrender.”
173
Terlinder v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289, 22 S. Ct. 484, 46 L.Ed. 534 (1902); Rebane, supra note 2, at 1636; See M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 572 (1974).
174
See Kristin Berdan Weissman, Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 459, 465 (1994).
175
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, 198 (2nd ed. 1998).
176
Id.
177
ICC Statute, supra note5, art. 89(1) and (2).

27

with the ICC’s jurisdiction,178 or there is a procedural problem under the national law,179 the
suspect will not be surrendered to the ICC. Therefore, although labeled surrender, the ICC
Statute attempts to model the current treaty system on extradition. But, additionally, the ICC
Statute requires member States to “ensure that there are procedures available under their national
law for all forms of cooperation.”180 This can be interpreted to mean the ICC Statute is not selfexecuting, but requires member States to pass national laws permitting or requiring surrender to
the ICC, which would be separate from the extradition treaty system already established.181 As
discussed infra, it cannot be argued the United States can use the current system of extradition to
ignore potential constitutional questions.
IV.

United States Constitutional Objections to the ICC

It has been argued that there is “no point of having an International Criminal Court
without the United States as member” because the ICC “would be utterly ineffective.”182
Although this may be true, the United States will not properly be able to join the ICC under its
current Constitution.183 The constitutional objections to the ICC fall under two categories: (1)
constitutional institutional concerns, and (2) constitutional protection concerns.184 These two
categories are barriers to effective participation by the United States within the ICC.
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The constitutional institutional concerns refer to the assertions that United States
participation in the ICC would be impermissible because of substantial legal imperatives of the
United States Constitution.185 Generally, a United States citizen could not be prosecuted by an
international court for offenses that would be cognizable under the judicial power of the United
States.186 Specifically, the constitutional imperatives make United States participation in the ICC
impermissible because the ICC fails to recognize certain fundamental rights guaranteed under the
United States Constitution – the most important of which is the right to jury by trial.187 One way
to understand the United States constitutional objections is to present two scenarios and discuss
the two main constitutional barriers within the scenario contexts when possible.
A.

Scenarios involving conflict between the United States and the ICC
1.

The Vice-President’s Scenario

The President of the United States is scheduled to attend a Super Bowl game, and a
terrorist sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran188 detonates a nuclear weapon within the
stadium. Due to the electromagnetic interference, the Vice-President of the United States is
unable to ascertain whether the President has survived so he convenes a majority of the
“principal officers of the executive departments” who all sign a written declaration to the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives stating the
President is unable to discharge “the powers and duties of his office.”189 Pursuant to the Twenty-
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Seguin, supra note 193, at 108.
187
Curabba, supra note 9, at 12; See U.S. Const. Fifth Amendment, which states “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
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of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”
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The Islamic Republic of Iran is a signatory to the Rome Statute, but has not yet ratified the treaty.
189
See U.S. Const. Amend. XXV.
186
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Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Vice President assumes the duties and
powers of Acting President.
While these events are occurring, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency learns
through an unreliable source within the Iranian government that Iran, in coordination with
several Islamic terrorist cells throughout Arabian Gulf States, is preparing tactical nuclear strikes
against United States forces and its allies within the middle-east region. Acting as the National
Command Authority190 from the White House situation room in Washington, D.C., the Acting
President orders an immediate full-scale nuclear strike against Tehran and all Iranian military
bases. The military and civilian casualties number in the millions.
Immediately after the United States strikes Iran, the President communicates with the
relevant parties and reassumes his duties. The remnants of the Iranian government immediately
protest the United States’ action to the United Nations Security Council as a violation of the
United Nations Charter. The United States blocks the Iranian protest through its veto power, but
Iran, a signatory to the ICC treaty, requests that the ICC Prosecutor initiate an investigation into
possible international crimes by the Vice-President. Pursuant to a legal interpretation set forth in
an International Court of Justice advisory opinion that states nuclear weapons are only allowed in
self-defense191 “under extreme circumstances in which the very survival of a State is in
question,”192 the ICC prosecutor initiates an investigation into the Vice-President’s conduct.193
190

See the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1621, et seq; See also 10 U.S.C. §162(b).
Self Defense has been interpreted according to the Caroline Rule which states that self-defense must be confined
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moment for deliberations.” See Louis Henkin, International Law 872 (3d ed. 1993).
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Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 25 I.L.M. 809 (July 9, 1996); See The
Department of the Army, Operational Law Handbook 5-14 (2000) [hereinafter Army Handbook], which states
nuclear weapons are “not prohibited by international law.”
193
See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 28(1)(b) where civilian leaders are held responsible to the ICC where they “as
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the superior; and (iii) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
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It is eventually revealed that Iran was not behind the nuclear detonation at the Super
Bowl, nor did Iran plan to attack the United States or its allies in the Gulf region. Thereafter,
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Vice-President both resign and a Grand
Jury is impaneled to decide whether to bring criminal charges. The President, in an effort to
move on from the tragedy, uses his powers under the Constitution194 to pardon both the VicePresident and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This prompts the ICC Prosecutor
to declare the United States has failed to properly investigate195 and prosecute the Vice-President
for his alleged war crimes and orders the Vice-President to be surrendered pursuant to Article 17
of the ICC Statute.196 The United States attempts to protect197 the ICC Prosecutor through the
United Nations Security Council, and before the ICC pre-trial chamber,198 but fails.

The

Department of Justice begins the process of surrendering the Vice-President to the ICC. In
response, the Vice-President immediately requests relief from the United States federal courts.
2.

The General’s Scenario

The de-militarized zone between North and South Korea199 becomes the site for increased
hostilities between the United States and North Korean forces. Ultimately, the North Korean
military strikes preemptively Allied forces. The Allied forces withstand the first attack, but it
becomes inevitable that the Allied forces will not be able to withstand a second push. The
United States Commanding General, while personally in the territory of South Korea and
understanding that his forces will soon be overwhelmed, orders tactical nuclear weapons to be

prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.”
194
U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 1, which states “…and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”
195
ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 20(3).
196
See Id., art. 17(1)(a) and (b).
197
Id., art. 19.
198
Id., art. 15.
199
The Republic of Korea (South Korea) is a signatory to the Rome Statute, but have not ratified the treaty.
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used against North Korean forces pursuant to his interpretation of the pre-set200 rules of
engagement201 prescribed by the National Command Authority.202

This halts the second

advance.
After a cease-fire is instituted, the President of the United States, succumbing to
international pressure, relieves the commanding general, and convenes a Court of Inquiry to
determine any violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the laws of war.203 The
three Generals assigned to the Court of Inquiry personally know the accused General. For
national security concerns, the Court of Inquiry convenes in private.

After two weeks of

investigation, the court clears the General of any wrongdoing stating that a concrete and direct
military advantage was gained, and the General acted reasonably.204 The Secretary of the Army
approves the court’s findings and no court-martial is convened or further action is taken. North
Korea, although not a signatory to the ICC Statute, requests the ICC to investigate.205 As with
the Vice-President scenario, the ICC Prosecutor requests the United States surrender the
General.206 The Department of Justice begins the process of surrendering the General to the ICC
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The President has pre-delegated the use of nuclear weapons to military commanders to such a degree that half of
the United States’ strategic nuclear weapons can be used without the President’s direct participation. See Louis
Henkin, et al., Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 78 (1990); See also 10 U.S.C. §164.
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Rules of Engagements, or ROE, “are directives issued by competent military authority to delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and air forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered. They are the means by which the National Command Authority (NCA)
and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy
and domestic and international law.” The Department of the Army, Army Handbook 8-1 (2000).
202
John R. Bolton, 40th Anniversary Conference Panel: The Risks and the Weaknesses of the International Criminal
Court from America’s Perspective, 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 186, 190 (2000), where it is assumed that the defensive use of
nuclear weapons would probably be considered a violation of the ICC subject matter.
203
See Article 135 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
204
See Army Hanbook, supra note 210, at 5-4, which states that if the military commander acts reasonably in the use
of force, they will not be held accountable.
205
See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 28(a)(i) and (ii) which states that the military commanders responsibility for
ICC jurisdiction occurs when the commander “either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have
known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and…that military commander or person
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”
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See Ellen Grigorian, The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional
Concerns, Congressional Research Services, 10 (January 6, 1999), which states that, hypothetically, complaints
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and, like the Vice-President, the General seeks immediate relief from United States Federal
courts.
B.

Preliminary analysis of whether the Constitution is implicated
1.

The ICC as an extension of the United States

Before the issue of the ICC’s constitutionality is discussed, it must be determined
whether the ICC “is best viewed as an instrumentality of the United States or as a foreign
entity.”207 Paul Marquardt, a noted commentator208 on the constitutionality of the ICC, argues the
ICC is not an extension of the United States government, especially since the ICC will operate
under its own laws and protocols from the authority of the entire international community.209 If
the ICC is not considered an extension of the United States, but rather a separate foreign entity,
the institutional and possibly the protection concerns of the Constitution are diminished.
Other promoters of the ICC, however, argue the ICC must be viewed as an extension of
the United States.210 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held in United States v.
Balsys,211 that:
If it could be said the United States and its allies had enacted
substantially similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses
of international character…then an argument could be made that
could be lodged against United States personnel serving in United Nations forces overseas; However, these is an
argument that the ICC will not be able to pass judgment on the decisions taken by the United Nations and its organs.
See ICJ Reports, Namibia Opinion 16, 45 (1971).
207
Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of the International Criminal Court, 33 Colum.
J. Transnat’l L. 73, 105 (1995) (This article is the most cited authority on the constitutionality of the ICC. The
Congressional Reporting Service, the research arm of Congress used this article as its sole authority in reporting to
Congress on the constitutionality of ratifying the ICC.); See Matthew A. Barrett Ratify or Reject: Examining the
United States’ Opposition to the International Criminal Court, 28 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 83, 108 (1999), which
states that “one way to avoid the argument that either the full range of United States constitutional guarantees or key
constitutional rights must be incorporated into the Rome Statute is to view the Court as an entity separate from the
United States.”
208
It should be noted that Marquardt and other pro-ICC commentators raise constitutional issues and then argue that
such concerns are not complete bars to the United States joining the United States. Anti-ICC commentators, such as
David Scheffer and John Bolton, argue that joining the ICC would violate the Constitution, but they fail to offer
legal analysis in support of their claims – i.e. they fail to discuss the major cases and analysis the Constitution.
209
Id., at 105.
210
Duffy, supra note 190, at 23.
211
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 683, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 1412 L. Ed. 2d. 575 (1998).
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the Bill of Rights should apply…the point would be that the
prosecution was as much on behalf of the United States as the
prosecution nation.
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, writes that the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights is “to
afford protection to persons whose liberty has been placed in jeopardy in an American
tribunal.”212 Therefore, if the ICC is prosecuting in the place or on behalf of the United States,
the ICC would be considered an extension of the United States judicial system.
This analysis is supported further by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert.213
In Reid, the Court stated that:
any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory
or final judgment, decree, or order of any court of the United
States…holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil
action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its
agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or
employee, is a party.214
In the scenarios presented, and if the United States was a member of the ICC, this holding would
have double meaning. The Court uses the term “party,” which in United States legal practice
means any individual or legal entity involved in a suit, on either side.215 And since the VicePresident and the General are officers of the United States, and if the United States ratified the
treaty, the United States would be obligated to provide judges,216 finances, support, and
information to the ICC. In these circumstances, since the ICC would be acting on behalf of the
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United States, it would be an extension of the United States.217 Thus, since the ICC would be,
essentially, a part of the United States, the constitutional rights would have to be applied.218
2.

The use of extradition to eliminate any Constitutional concerns

If the ICC is not considered an extension of the United States, it could be argued the use
of the extradition process would eliminate any ICC concerns involving the Constitution.
According to some commentators, if the surrender of a United States citizen were likened to the
federal government’s use of extradition treaties,219 the ICC would not violate the Constitution.220
Marquardt argues the extradition analogy provides the strongest evidence of the compatibility
between the ICC and the United States Constitution.221 The reason the extradition analogy is
encouraged is because of the “rule of non-inquiry,” and the legal precedent that extradition
proceedings are not criminal prosecutions.
According to the rule of non-inquiry, United States courts generally do not review the
procedural or substantive rights that an extradited individual would have in the requesting
State.222

Rather, during an extradition hearing, review is limited to whether the Federal court

has jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the extradition treaty, and whether there is
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evidence to support a finding of probable cause.223 Federal courts are bound by the existence of
an extradition treaty to presume the trial will be fair.224 “This is because, before entering into an
extradition treaty, the United States first determines whether the potential treaty partner has a
judicial system that provides due process and humane treatment of detainees.”225 In the ICC
context, surrender would entail “much more than an extraordinary extradition treaty.”226
It is tempting to analogize the surrender under the ICC, and extradition under a treaty, but
such an analogy is misplaced.227 Extradition and surrender are fundamentally different. Article
102 of the ICC Statute defines surrender as “the delivering up of a person by a State to the
Court.”228 Extradition, on the other hand, is the “delivering up of a person by one State to
another.”229 The concept of surrender is already a specialized principal within Status of Forces
Agreements (hereinafter referred to as “SOFA”) that are more akin to the ICC model, rather than
the extradition model.230 Under a SOFA, surrender is understood to mean231 as the release back
from a foreign sovereign of a military member to the individual’s State’s authorities – military
and/or law enforcement – for certain criminal activities.232 The reason being that under a SOFA,
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the sending State has primary jurisdiction over any acts that occur while in the exercise of one’s
official duties. Thus, for example, in the General’s scenario, if South Korea captured him, an
obligation would exist to surrender him to the United States according to the current SOFA
between the two countries.233
Another reason the analogy is imperfect, as Marquardt also acknowledges, is that the
surrender system was adopted for the ICC specifically to preempt comparisons between
surrender and extradition thereby avoiding legal conflicts involving other State’s constitutions.234
Therefore, the inverse argument is that, since the extradition system was specifically excluded to
accommodate other States, one cannot then advocate use the extradition system for purposes of
avoiding the United States Constitution.235 Furthermore, although Marquardt discounts the
argument,236 the United Nations International Law Commission has concluded the ICC would
not be competent to conclude extradition treaties because it would undermine the traditional
concept of existing extradition treaties between sovereigns.237 In sum, based on the actual
differences between the concepts of surrender and extradition, the current extradition system
cannot be used to by-pass the need for constitutional protections.
It also can be argued that, if the ICC Statute were equivalent to an extradition treaty, the
ICC Statute would be self-executing238 in the United States, eliminating the need to have
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implementing legislation239 and possibly avoid any constitutional concerns. However, because
the ICC Statute specifically distinguishes itself from the extradition system240 and requires
member States to pass legislation to ensure full cooperation with the ICC surrender system,241
the ICC treaty is not self-executing.242 Therefore, implementing legislation would seem clearly
be required for the United States to enforce any ICC obligations.243
A final difference between extradition and the ICC’s concept of surrender is that under
the United States extradition system there is not an “obligation to extradite.”244 The United
States, like many nations, may refuse to extradite based on the “political offense doctrine.”245
The political offense doctrine is made up of three principles. First, the State is at odds with the
requesting State and public outrage would ensue if the individual were extradited. Second, the
State does not believe the suspect would receive a fair trial within the requesting State. Third,
the suspect is being pursued essentially, for a political offense. Based on these international
realities, frequently, international criminals seek refuge in States with sympathetic ideology,
which makes extradition less likely under the political offense doctrine.246
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The political offense doctrine is not addressed in the ICC Statute, most likely because it
uses the system of surrender and not extradition, which the political offense doctrine is attached.
The extradition system cannot be used under the ICC’s surrender model because a failure to
cooperate with the ICC by surrendering a suspect leads to a referral to the United Nations
Security Council or the ICC’s Assembly of States.247 Thus, the attempt by commentators to use
the extradition system as an escape for a review of possible constitutional objections has no
merit.
3.

Territorial Jurisdiction and the issue of Status of Forces Agreements

There is a continuous concern that territorial jurisdiction248 questions make constitutional
protection concerns moot if the extradition analogy fails.249 In the scenarios presented supra, this
would only affect the General in Korea250 because he was physically in South Korea when he
ordered the nuclear attack. Since the General was present in South Korea’s territory, South
Korea’s territoriality jurisdiction trumps the United States nationality jurisdiction.251 In regards
to the Vice President, however, since he committed the act while in the United States, the
territoriality argument combined with nationality jurisdiction would trump Iran’s territoriality
jurisdiction for having the effect of the act in that State.252 The ICC, however, would still argue
that it has jurisdiction.253
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Based on the facts of the scenarios, in the absence of some kind of agreement254 – like a
SOFA255 – the jurisdiction of the State in which the offense is committed will usually prevail
over other claims of jurisdiction.256

An exception to the general rule of receiving State

jurisdiction is deployment for combat, wherein United States forces are generally subject to
exclusive United States jurisdiction.257 As the exigencies of combat subside, however, the
primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction may revert to the receiving State.258 Thus, since
the General’s acts took place outside the United States, constitutional rights appear not to be
applicable.259 And, this seems true whether or not the General was acting under the direction of
the “nation to which he owes his allegiance.”260
The Schooner Exchange case highlights this rule, when Justice Marshall wrote, “the
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is absolute and subject to no qualification
except such as it has agreed to.”261 This, taken with Article 98(2) of the ICC treaty, which states
commitments to the ICC do not supercede SOFA treaties,262 would mean, absent such an
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agreement, if the United States sent the General to South Korea to face judgment, South Korea,
as a sovereign nation, would have the authority to surrender the General to the ICC.263
Based on Article 98(2), there appears to be some protection for Commanding Generals
operating in countries that have SOFA’s with the United States. Under Article VII(3)(a)(ii) of
the NATO SOFA,264 for example, the United States has primary concurrent jurisdiction over
“offenses arising out of any act or omissions done in the performance of official duty.”265
However, under both international266 and United States law,267 acts that are considered
international crimes may not properly classified as an act or omission done in the performance of
official duty – by definition criminal conduct may not be official duty. Therefore, for the types
of crimes enumerated within the ICC Statute, a SOFA would not shield a military leader – like
the General or the Vice-President – from surrender to the ICC and the ICC could try military
commanders operating in foreign territory without a SOFA, if the State was able to obtain
personal matter jurisdiction.
C.

Constitutional institutional concerns
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The United States Constitution authorizes a finite number of federal government
institutions, namely, the legislative branch,268 the executive branch,269 and the judiciary.270 Each
of the institutions have limited powers. One argument against United States participation in the
ICC is that to do so would “amount to an impermissible use of constitutionally prescribed
powers.”271 That is, if the ICC infringes any powers prescribed by the Constitution to the
different federal branches of government, the participation of the United States in such a court
would be unconstitutional.
1.

The ICC as a violation of the Constitutional powers
a.

The ICC versus Article III of the Constitution
(1)

The ICC as inferior to the Supreme Court

Article III of the United States Constitution empowers and limits the Supreme Court and
the federal judiciary. A major concern when discussing institutional objections is that the ICC
will operate in violation of Article III,272 which states the “judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.”273 The problem then is with the ICC not being subject to Supreme
Court appellate review, even though vested with authority over United States citizens by
congressional direction.
A further problem is that if the United States ratified the ICC treaty, Congress would be
creating a court that potentially could try United States citizens for acts that are crimes under
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both international and domestic United States law.274 One of the top human rights counsel in the
United States, who is in favor of United States ratification of the ICC treaty, despite the
constitutional issues, admits that “the ICC can properly be considered an extension of the state’s
own domestic jurisdiction.”275 Thus, in her view, if approved by Congress and signed by the
President, the ICC would be considered a court inferior to the Supreme Court, whether or not it
the ICC would be considered an Article III court.276 Of note, this concept is not addressed in the
ICC treaty, and the final authority in regards to ICC cases is the Appeals Chamber of the ICC.277
It appears clear the ICC will not be inferior to the United States Supreme Court in
violation of the rule established in Reid v. Covert, which stated that the Supreme Court “has
regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.”278 Rather,
as discussed supra, the ICC will be complementary to the member States judicial systems.279
Since the subject matter of the ICC may also be crimes within the United States, the ICC and the
United States judicial system will, in reality, have parallel jurisdiction.280 Therefore, as in the
case of the Vice-President and the General, once the ICC gains jurisdiction, there would be no
appeal of any ruling, error, or sentence to the United States Supreme Court.281 Since the ICC
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treaty attempts to create a judicial system outside the framework of the United States system,
where the Supreme Court is the final authority, the ICC conflicts with Article III and is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
(2)

Non-military citizens before military tribunals

In addition to concerns about superiority of the Supreme Court, the ICC system appears
to violate the Constitution and established precedent interpreting the relationship of the judiciary
to the other two branches of government. For example, in Ex Parte Milligan,282 a case involving
United States citizen being convicted before a military court when civilian courts were
operable.283 Thus, the Supreme Court held the military court was not an Article III court, and,
therefore, the military court could exercise no part of the judicial power of the country.284
This concept is taken further in light of Reid v. Covert,285 where Justice Black tested the
theory that Article III would be usurped if a foreign court attempted to adjudicate crimes
committed by United States citizens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Court held
that an American civilian “could not be subjected to trial in a military court overseas, even
though an international agreement between Britain and the United States appeared to allow such
a trial.”286 Justice Black wrote that “at the beginning we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against civilians abroad,” it could do so free of the Constitution.287
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Given the cases, it is clear non-military citizens cannot be tried in a military tribunal,
either in the United States or in a foreign State, for crimes occurring within the jurisdiction of the
United States. And, this is true despite any treaty to the contrary. This is instructive in
considering the ICC is, essentially, a military tribunal in the sense that its subject matter is solely
related to crimes occurring during war or armed hostilities – whether internal or between States.
Therefore, the ICC could not try the Vice-President, in the scenario presented, because he is a
civilian and such a trial would be in violation of Article III of the Constitution.
(3)

Enemy aliens and military tribunals

But, Marquardt asserts Ex Parte Milligan can be distinguished.288 In his view, Ex Parte
Milligan is limited to civilian crimes committed by civilians, such as petty larceny.289 In support
of this, he argues Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox290 stands for the proposition that in times of war, nonArticle III courts can be convened to adjudicate violations of the laws of war by civilians even
though civilian courts are still operable.291 Thus, since the subject matter of the ICC deals
exclusively with the laws of war, the ICC would be constitutional.
Marquardt’s argument would be more persuasive if Ex Part Quirin dealt with United
States citizens. But, that case concerned a trial by military commission of German military
personnel accused of acting as spies and saboteurs within the United States. These soldiers were
brought to the United States by a German submarine and deposited in key locations wearing
German military uniforms. Only when they reached American soil did they transferred to
civilian garb.
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Justice Stone, writing for the Supreme Court, held in Ex parte Quirin that a United States
military court could try enemy forces for the violations of the law of war if captured within the
United States,292 which clearly limited this type of case to enemy aliens.293 Furthermore, Justice
Stone stated that “in time of war and in the times of peace, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to
preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty.”294 Thus, to argue Ex Parte
Quirin should extend to the proposition that United States military members could be
surrendered to a foreign court exercising Article III powers is a questionable leap, especially
since Justice Stone hinted at the limited scope of Ex Parte Quirin when he stated the Court had
“no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of
military tribunal to try persons according to the law of war.”295 He did, however, clearly state
that if the military tribunal was in violation of the Constitution, the military tribunal would be
invalid.296
In addition Ex Parte Quirin, Marquardt and other commentators attempt to use the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of its authority over military tribunals of enemy aliens captured
abroad as persuasive authority for the proposition the ICC does not violate Article III of the
Constitution.297 In Re Yamashita, Justice Stone, again writing for the Supreme Court, held
enemy aliens had no constitutional based objections to being tried by a military tribunal set up by
the victors to adjudicate war crimes.298 General Yamashita was the Japanese commanding
general of the Imperial Japanese forces occupying the Philippines, which at the time of World

292

Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S at 23.
Id. at 25 stating that “constitutional safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to
be disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on some who are guilty;” See also Ex Parte Milligan, 316 U.S.
at 132; Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942)
294
Id. at 6.
295
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.
296
Id. at 25.
297
Marquardt, supra note 216, at 130; Andreasen, supra note 227, at 726.
298
In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (1946).
293

46

War II was a territory of the United States.299

Upon surrender, General Yamashita was

immediately put on trial for war crimes before a military court.300
Justice Stone clearly stated the holdings In Re Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin dealt only
with military tribunals dealing with enemy combatants,301 holding it was “an important incident
to the conduct of war” for the “adoption of measures by the military commander, not only to
repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who,
in their attempt to thwart or impede our effort, have violated the law of war.”302 Justice Stone
also emphasized the United States had actually declared war on the State of the petitioner,
which effected the military commander’s ability to discipline “without qualifications as to the
exercise of this authority so long as a state of war exists – from its declaration until peace is
proclaimed.”303 Therefore, although Justice Stone points out in In Re Yamashita that United
States military members were also subject to trial by military tribunals,304 with a United States
judicial panel deciding guilt, the limited power to review such tribunal decisions and requires
constitutional guarantees is limited to declared war.305 Thus, since in the scenarios presented, a
state of war was not declared against either Iran or Korea, the cases cited by Marquardt can be
distinguished on the facts.
When the Supreme Court revisited the In Re Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin decisions in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court found in war, alien enemies do not receive constitutional
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protections.306

To use these decisions, therefore, to argue that the Vice-President and the

General in the presented scenarios should be surrendered to the ICC does not follow. Both, the
Vice-President and the General believed they were acting according to their constitutional duties
to protect and defend the United States and her allies.
Even if these cases were persuasive authority, they are inappropriate within the context of
the ICC. As discussed supra, once a case is adjudicated within the ICC, there is no opportunity
to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Justice Black, dissenting in Eisentrager, argues
that when hostilities have ceased with an enemy nation, the enemy alien at least has the ability to
file a writ of habeas corpus with the courts.307 Since the argument is that the ICC is an extension
of the United States judicial system, and since the General and the Vice-President are both
United States citizens, it would appear that, when hostilities have ended, they too would have the
ability to seek habeas corpus relief from the United States judiciary. But under the ICC treaty,
this is not allowed, which calls into question whether the court is unconstitutional.
(4)

Enemy aliens and international tribunals

Ex Parte Quirin, In Re Yamashita, and Johnson v. Eisentrager are all case dealing with
United States military tribunals. But, Marquardt raises another argument that the Supreme Court
has never held Article III restricted the United States from participating in the international
military tribunals at the end of World War II.308 In support of this argument Marquardt refers to
Hirota v. MacArthur, where the Court held:
the military tribunal set up in Japan by General MacArthur as the
agent of the Allied Powers is not a tribunal of the United States
and the courts of the United States have no power or authority to
306
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review, affirm, set aside, or annul the judgments and sentences
imposed by it on these petitioners, all of whom are citizens of
Japan.
Based on this, Marquardt relies on Hirota for the proposition that the ICC is an international
body, not a domestic court, and, therefore, Article III is not violated.309
But this argument fails on several points. First, as was articulated by David Scheffer, the
United States Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes and the lead negotiator to the ICC treaty
negotiations, reminded that “we must recall that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals actually
operated with the consent of the state of nationality of the defendants as a consequence of the
surrender instruments signed by Germany and Japan, respectively. In the case of Nuremberg, the
Allied Powers also had supreme authority in Germany,”310 and the international tribunals was not
founded on international law, but was “one of political power and one of war.”311 Therefore,
since the accused Japanese and German citizens had never been to the United States, the
petitioners in Hirota could never have expected to have constitutional protections. In addition, as
discussed supra, the cases dealing with international military tribunals reaffirmed the concept
that “one state or group of states can set up military tribunals” to try enemies for war crimes that
are captured within the territory they control.312
Second, the Supreme Court in Hirota was clear that its ruling would have been different if
a United States citizen was making the appeal.313 And, this is consistent with the Court’s rulings
in Ex Parte Quirin and In Re Yamashita, which dealt with enemy aliens. Hirota also strengthens
the argument presented in Reid v. Covert that United States citizens are still protected by the
Constitution, even if tried abroad by a court of the United States. Therefore, if the Vice-President
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or the General were making requests as United States citizens, under Hirota, courts would have
been less inclined to take the international tribunals decisions at face value.
The third argument is that because the enforcing power of the Tokyo tribunal was
General MacArthur’s, an official of the United States, actions, even abroad, could be questioned
by the Court. In this regard, Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Hirota specifically asserted the
Supreme Court would always have jurisdiction when the “conduct of its own officials” was in
question.314 Justice Douglas went on to state, “the Constitution follows the flag” and General
MacArthur was “an American citizen who [was] performing functions for our own government.
It is our Constitution which he supports and defends.”315 By this reasoning, however, General
MacArthur’s actions, not the tribunal’s decisions, could be questioned.

In the scenarios

presented, the Vice-President and the General were performing official functions on behalf of the
United States government. Because of the “official status” of their acts, the Douglas concurrence
would add credence to the fact that their actions, done under the authority of the United States
Constitution, must be reviewed by governmental courts of that same authority. Thus, since they
were conducting official acts and can’t be considered enemy aliens, the ICC would conflict with
the powers of Article III and, therefore, appear to be unconstitutional.
Audrey Benison, a recent commentator of the constitutionality of the ICC, argues the
recent case of Ntakirutimana v. Reno316 allows for non-enemy surrender to international criminal
tribunals.317 The general rule in Ntakirutimana is there is no constitutional bar to prevent the
surrender of a Rwandan citizen to face charges of genocide in the absence of an Article II
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extradition treaty.318 This holding, however, is clearly limited to the rule that an extradition
treaty is not required for a state to surrender an accused, and the Court did not even consider the
constitutionality of the tribunal. Finally, the Court was dealing with a Rwandan citizen, not a
United States citizen. The Rwandan citizen was a public figure in Rwanda during the tragedy in
that State. Therefore, Rwanda, and through it the Ad Hoc Tribunal, had a claim for jurisdiction.
Unquestionably, the only issue was whether extradition could occur without a treaty, and
therefore, the Ntakirutimana case is limited in scope and can never stand for the proposition
United States citizens are to be surrendered to an international criminal tribunal.
(5)

United States military and courts-martials

Although the enemy alien cases are distinguishable from the scenarios presented, it is true
Article III courts do not judge United States military members tried by court-martial for
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.319 Courts-martial are convened under the
authority of Article II Commander-In-Chief powers, which permits courts-martial to sit in
territory outside the United States.320 In Williams v. Froehlke, the appellate court stated “there
must be federal criminal jurisdiction for a trial to properly occur in an Article III court.”321 In
Williams, a military member was accused of committing a crime against a German citizen while
stationed in Germany. Since the crime was a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and also a federal crime under 10 U.S.C. §922, a United States military court-martial was proper
to try the accused military member in Germany.322
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Thus, in the General’s scenario, the Court of Inquiry assumed jurisdiction over the
General’s acts under the same legal standard. However, because the courts-martial is a United
States court, albeit not an Article III court, the Supreme Court still retains review authority under
Article III.323 Therefore, Article III would be violated in the scenarios presented if the General
would be barred from seeking relief from the Supreme Court.
The courts-martial distinction does not affect the Vice-President scenario. Although
acting as Commander-In-Chief, he is not subject to courts-martial jurisdiction because he is a
United States civilian; and he is a United States civilian and within the territory of the United
States where civil courts are available. Also, under Ex Parte Milligan, the Vice-President is only
subject to Article III courts.324 Conversely, the General acted outside the United States in the
independent country of South Korea, and under the Williams case, the General would be subject
to a court-martial by United States military authorities in South Korea.
Nonetheless, the Williams case does not stand for the proposition that the United States is
to surrender the General over to the ICC. The General was cleared by a Court of Inquiry, and he
would not face extradition because a United States tribunal has determined no probable cause in
as much as the General acted reasonably. Clearly, the Constitution was designed to control and
limit the powers of government through separation of powers that must include an independent
judiciary.325 Therefore, the executive and legislative branches cannot transfer the essential
powers of the judiciary to a non-constitutional institution. Such a transfer would appear to
violate Article III of the Constitution.
b.

The ICC as a violation of Article II powers
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Under Article II of the United States, the executive branch of the government has three
powers that would come into conflict with the ICC structure. First, the structure would conflict
with the executive power to negotiate treaties; second, the powers enumerated as CommanderIn-Chief; and third, the pardon powers. Although, for the United States to become a member of
the ICC, the President is obligated to sign the treaty, which was done by President Clinton before
he left office, the Supreme Court has held that the President is unable to surrender any executive
authority.326 An argument that a federal court should bar an accused’s surrender to the ICC
would be that the President has abandoned his constitutional duties under Article II.
(1)

The treaty powers

Under Article II of the United States Constitution, the President has the power to make
treaties with foreign nations, if two-thirds of the United States Senate consents.327 This treaty
power is restricted only by the Constitution and “considerations of public policy and justice
which controls civilized nations.”328

(Although it is hotly debated, the President has the

exclusive authority to terminate a treaty outright,329 without the consent of the Senate.)330 Thus,
Professor Louis Henkin argues the President’s treaty making power authorizes delegation of
power to the ICC as long as the delegated power is subject to the same constitutional checks and
balances of the other branches of government the President would face.331 In his view, President
would be able to assign enforcement powers to the ICC, much as a State court can adjudicate
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federal crimes.332 The obvious counter-argument is that, by joining the ICC, the President would
abdicate portions of his executive powers, which is a violation of the Constitution.
Under Article 86 of the ICC Statute, member States have an obligation to cooperate fully
with the ICC.333 The ICC determines what cooperation is required, not the member State.334 A
failure to cooperate would result in a referral of the matter to the United Nations, or the
Assembly of State Parties,335 which is not controlled by the United Nations and is outside the
United Nations veto power of the United States. Compounding the inability of the member State
to control ICC powers is the provision of the ICC Statute that permits withdrawal from the ICC,
but takes effect only after one year of the announced intention to withdrawal.336 During that year
period, the member State is required to fulfill obligations to the ICC337 or face referral to the
Assembly of State Parties. Thus, these are clear restrictions on the ability of the United States
President to fulfill his executed duties.338 Although the President would be able under domestic
law to terminate the treaty, in theory, under the ICC treaty, the executive branch abdicates this
ability for at least a one-year period.339
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Marquardt argues the inverse of this point, citing Missouri v. Holland340 as persuasive
authority that the existence of the ICC treaty actually enhances the President’s ability to execute
his constitutional duties, and, therefor, the ICC does not interfere with any constitutional
provisions.341 As with the In Re Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin cases discussed supra, however,
Justice Holmes limited any such shadow on the Constitution.342 Justice Holmes stated the
Federal government could enter into a treaty only where it does “not contravene any prohibitory
words to be found in the Constitution,”343 explaining the Constitution’s superiority, as it relates
to United States citizens, to any other instrument of international significance.344 In short, the
United States is able to make treaties, but only so long as the treaty does not encumber any of the
powers laid out in the Constitution, or change the “character of government.”345
Marquardt also uses Wilson v. Girard to argue the Supreme Court avoids weighing in on
decisions by other branches of government to enter into a treaty with a foreign country.346
Wilson is most commonly used to buttress the President’s authority to enter into executive
agreements to implement a treaty provision.347

The Court in Wilson, however, stated the

wisdom of a treaty arrangement “is exclusively in the determination of the executive and the
legislature.”348 But, this case can be distinguished on two points. First, the Court was discussing
a jurisdictional treaty issue between the United States and another sovereign nation, which
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reiterated the territoriality jurisdiction rule decided in the Schooner Exchange case,349 and
discussed supra.
Second, the treaty in question was the SOFA between the United States and Japan.350
The Wilson case involved a Specialist Third Class Girard, who while stationed in Japan, fired
spent shells out of his grenade launcher toward Japanese civilians and killed one.351 Under the
SOFA, primary jurisdiction over Girard was with the United States military,352 yet, the United
States waived primary jurisdiction in the case of Girard.353 Clearly the United States never
abrogated its right to retain jurisdiction under the SOFA, as it would in the ICC treaty, but
instead merely waived its primary jurisdiction and in the isolated case of Girard. This permitted
Japan to assert its jurisdiction of the military member under the territoriality doctrine.
Given these distinctions, Wilson clearly does not stand for the proposition that the Court
will avoid interference with the ability to make treaties that grants away criminal jurisdiction, as
Marquardt infers. The case merely stands for the proposition that, in a treaty which gives the
United States primary criminal jurisdiction,354 the executive may waive jurisdiction to another
sovereign State that also has jurisdiction.
This reasoning cannot be used in the context of the ICC treaty, which allows for
concurrent jurisdiction, but which, in reality, permits the ICC to assert primary jurisdiction if the
member State fails to meet expectations. In addition, the ICC cannot be considered a sovereign
349
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350
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1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4509, 4510. This treaty superceded Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security
Treaty Between the United States and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 2492, which was in force when
Wilson case arose.
351
Wilson, 354 U.S. at 526.
352
Bassiouni, supra note 184, at 135.
353
Id.
354
It should also be noted that without the SOFA treaty with Japan, the military member would be subject to
Japanese law for criminal acts under the territoriality principle. Therefore, if the General were arrested in Korea for
his acts, he could be tried there or in the ICC for his crimes.

56

State. In the scenarios presented, the United States did not waive jurisdiction, but rather handled
both cases within the United States judicial system. Therefore, Wilson would not be persuasive
authority for the scenarios presented because the United States acted upon its jurisdiction, rather
than waiving this right.
As discussed supra, within the context of the territoriality jurisdiction principle, the
United States may negotiate as to which country will exercise primacy of jurisdiction even when
the offenses remain within the judicial power of the United States.355 In effect, the United States
may give up jurisdiction of an individual to another sovereign State when it concludes that State
has a stronger claim on the criminal offense. The ICC, not being a sovereign nation, but rather
an international organization, therefore will not have standing to assert territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, since the ICC treaty would change not only the powers under the United States executive
branch, but also the legislative and judicial branches, the ICC treaty is unconstitutional.
(2)

The power of the Commander-In-Chief

The United States Constitution provides for the power over the United States military to
be held, principally, by the executive branch.356 As Commander-In-Chief, the President has vast
authority to respond to attacks against the United States.357

In responding to attacks, the

President will be granted absolute immunity for any official acts taken within that authority.358
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, Justice Powell stated for the Court that alternative checks, such as
impeachment and congressional scrutiny, would provide adequate assurances the President was
not “above the law.”359 Since, in our scenario, the Vice-President was Acting President under
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Vice-President would also be entitled to this absolute
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357
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immunity.360 Since the immunity has its foundation in the separation of powers, a treaty could
not contravene it. (However, it is noteworthy that, if the Vice-President was impeached for the
acts stated in the scenario, the Vice-President would then be liable and subject to indictment.)361
The ICC treaty would undermine this presidential immunity. Article 27 of the ICC
Statute clearly states that immunities, whether under international or national law, is not a bar for
the jurisdiction of the ICC.362 Thus, the Ad Hoc Tribunals have set the standard for this
elimination of immunities when it requested the surrender of ex-President Soloban Milosevic
from the Former Yugoslavia.363 This same approach could be applied in the case of the VicePresident’s scenario, and a claim of absolute immunity would not be a viable defense to an
assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC. Thus, since the Vice-President would not have this defense,
a serious issue of constitutionality of the ICC treaty, which constrains the powers and immunities
of the United States executive branch, would be raised.
Another, serious issue is that the President, who is responsible for directing the
Department of Justice to investigate alleged criminal acts, as in the case of the Vice-President,
could be hindered from carrying out his constitutional duties. As with the ICC, the Ad Hoc
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Tribunals are assumed to have complimentary jurisdiction.364 An aspect of this jurisdiction is
that, if a State is conducting its own investigation and beginning the preparation of criminal
proceedings against the individual, the ICC and the Ad Hoc Tribunals should defer investigation
and assumption of jurisdiction until the State is finished.365 In the Milosevic case, the Ad Hoc
Tribunal did not wait until the national court had finished its judicial process before demanding
jurisdiction.366 This problem could also permit the ICC to interfere with executive powers of the
President of the United States367 – such as law enforcement duties – in violation of the United
States Constitution.
In addition, the President will be hindered in the application of military force – such as in
peacekeeping missions.368 Commanding generals could second guess the orders of the President
because the ability to defend their decision before a Court of Inquiry will be diminished. Under
the scenarios presented, the Vice-President, the General, and others who followed the orders of
these officials might be subject to prosecution by the ICC.369 Thus, political and military leaders
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who are constitutionally responsible for the United States’ foreign policy could be hindered in
their ability to carry out their duties.370
(3)

The pardon power

The United States Constitution provides for the President to have “the power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States.”371 Although the concept of
presidential pardon is not specifically discussed within the ICC treaty,372 it is clear the subject
matter of the ICC includes acts that are crimes under United States law.373

Thus, an

interpretation of Article 27 would show such a pardon irrelevant in the eyes of the ICC, even
when the subject matter is within the scope of the United States judiciary.374 So, for example, in
the case of the Vice-President scenario, under the ICC, the fact that he was pardoned by the
President would be irrelevant and not bar prosecution by the ICC.
Historically, the pardon power has been a powerful tool for the United States in uniting
the country after a contentious period.375 In fact, the last time a United States military member
was convicted of war crimes during the Vietnam War,376 the President used his pardon powers to
first commute the death penalty sentence to life imprisonment, and then, later, to afford another
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reduction to parole.377 The President’s rationale for this action was the necessity to heal the
nation and move forward by putting the past behind the nation. In addition, as discussed supra,
commentators argue that the ICC cannot interfere with a SOFA.378 However, the SOFA treaties
specifically states that if an individual has been pardoned, “he may not be tried again for the
same offense within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party.”379 This
language, therefore, directly contradicts the authority to be ceded to the ICC, thus making the
SOFA’s less effective.
The promoters of the ICC argue that when there is a “clear conflict between the
constitutional and international law, national law determines the hierarchy between the two.”380
National law encompasses treaties, statutes, common law, and the Constitution. When there is a
conflict between international law and the Constitution, the Constitution trumps every time
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.381 The pardon power, being a part of the Constitution, cannot
be amended because the “Executive, or the Executive and Senate combined” cannot amend the
Constitution by “means other than those prescribed by the Constitution.”382 Since joining the
ICC would theoretically amend the Constitution by taking away powers that the Constitution
grants, the ICC is unconstitutional without a constitutional amendment.
c.

The ICC as a violation of Article I

Under Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress has the power to “constitute
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”383 Under Article II, the Senate must concur by two-
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thirds vote United States entry into a treaty.384 The ICC as an inferior court to the Supreme
Court was discussed, supra, and it appears clear the ICC would violate Article III and Article I if
the ICC was anything other than an inferior to the Supreme Court. However, one of the favorite
arguments of pro-ICC commentators is that the constitutional concerns are negated by the Define
and Punish Clause385 of Article I.386 Marquardt, for example, argues this clause can “sustain the
creation of a non-Article III tribunal to try citizens of the United States.”387 He goes on to argue
that this clause justifies the ICC in the same way territorial and military courts are permissible,
because the creation of these types of courts is an exercise of powers of general governance.388
He also argues, since there is no other reference to “laws of nations” in the Constitution,
Congress can determine how to enforce violations of such laws outside of Article III.389
As discussed supra, in dealing with the contradictions of the ICC with Article III,
Marquardt relies on Ex Parte Quirin, In Re Yamashita, and Missouri v. Holland to support the
notion that Congress has authority to recognize international courts under the Define and Punish
Clause.390 The two war related cases of Ex Parte Quirin and In Re Yamashita dealt with enemy
non-citizen aliens, and the treaty case of Missouri v. Holland established that the Constitution
could not be violated or superceded by a treaty. Noteworthy, the Court in the In Re Yamashita
case does not refer to the Define and Punish clause, but rather relates to the Articles of War
passed by Congress.391 The power to declare war falls under a different clause392 than the Define
and Punish Clause. Finally, Marquardt’s argument is, at best, novel, since the Define and Punish
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Clause has never been used to justify the creation of an international tribunal to punish crimes or
cited in conjunction with the Article II treaty power.393
Contrary to Marquardt’s argument, the more persuasive interpretation of the Define and
Punish clause is, first, that Congress is empowered to recognize violations of the law of nations,
i.e., jus cogens; second, Congress may define punishments for such violations by United States
citizens to be enforced by the executive and adjudged by the judiciary under the constitutional
framework.394 (Congress is not authorized to pass judgment on a violation of the laws of nation,
because that power is reserved to Article III courts.395) This interpretation squares with historical
definitions of the Define and Punish Clause.

The Clause may have been placed in the

Constitution to allow the Federal government to have jurisdiction over criminal acts that occur
against Ambassadors by common citizens, which is not only a violation of the laws of nations,
but also, such acts are within the jurisdiction of State authorities.396 Thus, the Define and Punish
Clause does not appear to be authority permitting the United States to join the ICC.
B.

Constitutional Protection Concerns

Besides the institutional concerns discussed supra, the Constitution would not allow
United States citizens to be tried before an international court that does not guarantee the full
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range of constitutional protections397 criminal defendants have when they are tried before a
United States court.398 One commentator argues this “criticism that under the ICC United States
service personnel will be denied due process protections that they would enjoy under the
Constitution is totally misplaced. I can think of no right guaranteed to military personnel by the
United States Constitution that is not also guaranteed by the treaty of Rome.”399 This statement
is not correct.

Although there are several questionable comparisons between the rights

guaranteed under the ICC Statute and that of the Constitution, it is clear a defendant before the
ICC will not receive a trial by jury.
As discussed supra, since the ICC may be considered an extension of the United States,
the level of protection should not change merely because the government agrees to participate in
the ICC through ratification of a treaty.400 Although many commentators argue the ICC does not
guarantee several of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights,401 the most glaring exception is the
right to a jury trial.402 The ICC does not have the option for a defendant to be tried by a jury of
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their peers.403 Commentators argue the right to trial by jury is not required by the Constitution
for military members, however, they are silent when discussing civilians such as the VicePresident.404
The argument that the right to a trial by jury is not required for military members is
faulty. Article V of the United States Constitution specifically states that the trial of all crimes
shall be by jury.405 Commentators who argue that a military member is not entitled to a trial by
jury do not cite Article V, but rather point to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for justification.406
This argument has several flaws. First, The constitutional language of the Fifth Amendment
discusses Grand Jury investigations only and when discussing military forces, Grand Juries are
only not necessary when the member is actual service “in time of War or public danger.”407 In
fact, military members who face a general court-martial do receive a pre-trial hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to proceed with trial.408

Second, if the Sixth

Amendment is taken by itself or only in coordination with the Fifth Amendment, it is
conceivable that a jury trial is only applicable within the United States409 – which would exclude
the ICC from following this rule because the Court will based in The Hague, Netherlands.
However, Article V clearly requires trial by jury for criminal acts for which the United States has
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jurisdiction even if the act was not committed within the United States.410 The concept that a
defendant is entitled to a trial by a jury when the criminal act was within the jurisdiction of the
United States was reiterated in Reid, where the defendant was tried by court-martial without a
jury while in England.411
The American Bar Association cites Middendorf v. Henry as stating that the Constitution
does not support the argument that a jury trial is available to military members,412 even as crimes
against the United States.413 Middendorf does not stand for that proposition. In that case, exMarines, who were discharged pursuant to a summary court-martial, argued that their Sixth
Amendment rights were violated because they were not given counsel and did not receive a jury
by trial.414 A summary court-martial cannot be compared to a trial before the ICC.415 First,
summary court-martial can not be used for capital offenses,416 which under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice includes all the offenses within the subject matter of the ICC – i.e. rape,417
murder,418 war crimes,419 etc. For these types of offenses, a jury trial by general court-martial is
required.420
Second, a summary court-martial is not mandated. A military member could elect not to
be judged by a summary court-martial and then either a special or general court-martial would
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automatically be convened with a sitting jury.421 Article 20 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice specifically provides that “[n]o person with respect to whom summary courts-martial
have jurisdiction may be brought to trial before a summary courts-martial if he objects
thereto…”422 Therefore, as in civilian courts, if a military member wishes to waive a jury trial
by having a summary court-martial, that is within their prerogative.
Third, a summary court-martial is procedurally different from a regular criminal trial. “In
the first place, it is not an adversary proceeding.”423 The ICC is adversarial in nature.424 Since it
is an adversary proceeding, a necessary element is met to conclude that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial is required.425 Finally, the Court specifically stated in Middendorf, that they
have not had the occasion to determine whether the Sixth Amendment should apply to general
and special courts-martial, which are adversarial in nature, because military are guaranteed that
right through federal statute.426 However, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Middendorf is clear
indication that if Sixth Amendment rights were in question, “surely those sworn to risk their lives
to defend the Constitution should derive some benefit from” the Sixth Amendment.427
Using the right to a jury trial as an example, it is evident that, for the United States to be a
member of the ICC, the ICC must allow comparable rights found in the Bill of Rights. This is
especially true since the ICC will be considered an extension of the United States and its judicial
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authority. Without the procedural due process guarantees, the United States cannot become a
member State to the ICC.
V.

Conclusion

The movement towards human rights and the modern concept of international
humanitarian law is directly linked to the concept of democracy and constitutionalism.428 The
United States would not be encouraging this movement by forsaking certain principles upon
which the United States Constitution is founded. By forcing the ICC into a parallel existence
with the United States judicial system, the constitutional framework and separation of powers
that has worked extremely well for the United States would be in jeopardy. Constitutional
compatibility must be addressed before the United States considers joining the ICC.429
At the very least, the constitutional rights – such as a right to a jury trial – that every
United States citizen expects should be required of the ICC. The only possibility of the United
States joining the ICC treaty is through a constitutional amendment, as France recently did with
its Constitution.430 However, before the United States gives away the constitutional rights of its
military and political leaders, it should consider that these people are the same individuals who
have pledged to defend the constitutional privileges of their fellow citizens. The ICC “represents
such a fundamental change in American constitutional practice that a full national debate and the
full participation of Congress are imperative.”431
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If the rest of the world feels the need to band together to form an international court
because their own national systems are inadequate – so be it.432 However, the United States
should not break a constitutional system – albeit with some flaws – that balances power and
protects the common citizen by rushing blindly into a treaty that will be unconstitutional.

The

United States currently refuses to ratify the ICC treaty until its concerns – which include
constitutional compatibility – are met.433 This should continue to be the United States policy.
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